



IN THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY
José L. Alvarez*
Silviya Svejenova**
RESEARCH PAPER No 435
April, 2001
*  Professor of General Management, IESE





08034 Barcelona - Spain
Copyright © 2001, IESE
Do not quote or reproduce without permission
IESE
UNIVERSITY OF NAVARRAGOVERNING NETWORK EVOLUTION
IN THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY
Abstract
This paper provides a managerial account of network governance by exploring how
initially non-powerful agents, driven by the quest for distinctive identity, shape the
governance of their networks over time. The research design is that of a longitudinal
comparative case study of the trajectories of three renowned, Oscar-winning Spanish
filmmakers. It scrutinizes data coming from original interviews, as well as from multiple
secondary data sources, in order to illustrate the propositions advanced. The paper’s
contribution is sought (1) in proposing a micro-level framework for systematic thinking about
network governance evolution, distinguishing four dimensions (co-governance, structure,
strategy, and pace) and their respective sub-categories; (2) in advancing three peculiar
identity profiles with different implications for the evolution of network governance (i.e., a
maverick, an integrated professional, and a broker); (3) in bringing together two bodies of
literature that have not conversed frequently (i.e., network governance and identity) in a
largely overlooked cultural and historical context, that of Spain after the transition to
democracy in 1975.GOVERNING NETWORK EVOLUTION
IN THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY
Huge global conglomerates and small companies are increasingly embracing
network forms of governance (Laubacher & Malone, 1999; see also Nohria & Ghoshal
(1997) on multinational companies as differentiated networks; Galbraith (2000) on informal
and formal global networks; Walker, Kogut, & Shan (1997) and Baum, Calabrese, &
Silverman (2000) on biotech startups). Researchers from different perspectives on
organizations show a remarkable interest in the study of these network forms. Some have
tried to distinguish them from other forms of governance (Powell, 1990; Jones, 1993; Ebers,
1997), or have focused on the social mechanisms through which they operate (e.g., Jones,
Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Uzzi, 1997; Ring 1997). Others have inquired into the formation
processes, looking at their endogenous and/or exogenous dynamics (e.g., Gulati & Garguilo,
1999; Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2000; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996), or delineating
distinct formation paths (Doz, Olk, & Ring, 2000). Apart from the functionality of networks
as governance forms (e.g., learning, legitimacy, status, economic benefits), scholars have
increasingly paid attention to networks’ costs (Ebers & Grandori, 1997) and dysfunctionality,
such as decay (what Burt (2000) calls the tendency for relationships to weaken and
disappear), demise and failure (e.g., Ariño & de la Torre, 1998; Podolny & Page, 1998;
Human & Provan, 2000). 
While various studies have addressed diverse evolutionary issues (e.g., Human &
Provan 2000, Doz et al. 2000, Gulati & Garguilo 1999), they have traced networks’ evolution
rather than the evolution of the governance of these networks, and have predominantly
provided macro-insights (at the organizational and inter-organizational levels of analysis).
Networks, however, are not a standard organizational solution, and hence, require permanent
management attention and action (Ebers & Grandori, 1997). In addition, inter-organizational
relations are embodied (and embedded) in interpersonal bonds between managers and
employees from different enterprises. Therefore, apart from providing increased
understanding of network phenomena, network theory should speak to the concerns of the
managers who govern these complex organizational arrangements (Kanter & Eccles, 1992).
This paper provides such a managerial account of network governance by exploring
how initially non-powerful agents in a field, driven by the quest for a distinctive identity,
shape the governance of their networks over time. Identity is depicted on a micro level,
focusing on two parameters – social (represented by the concept of role versatility) and
personal (captured by the notion of style). Underlying assumption is that action is capable of
influencing social structure (e.g., Padgett & Ansell, 1993; Weick, 1996; Alvarez, 2000), and
that the social organization arises from identity formation out of control efforts (White,
1992). The study is situated within the context of a unique inter-organizational field, the
Spanish film industry in the last 25 years and, similar to Greenfeld (1989), it uses art to add
to the understanding of social reality. The film industry is a frequent empirical site for
addressing network issues. Still, insights come predominantly from the Hollywood pitch
(e.g., Faulkner & Anderson, 1987; Jones, 1993). When situated elsewhere, studies mostly
employ macro approaches (e.g., Ghertman & Hadida (1998) on the French film industry,
Sydow & Windeler (1998) on the German television industry, Starkey, Barnatt, & Tempest
(2000) on the U.K. television industry). This study opens up new ground by providing a
longitudinal, comparative micro account of network governance evolution in the context of
the Spanish cinema.
The paper’s contribution is sought first in proposing a micro-level framework for
systematic thinking about network governance evolution, distinguishing four dimensions (co-
governance, structure, strategy, and pace) and their respective sub-categories. Second, it
advances three peculiar identity profiles with different implications for the evolution of
network governance (i.e., a maverick, an integrated professional, and a broker). “Maverick”
and “integrated professional” (Becker, 1982) label two different identities – the former, of an
agent who breaks the canons of acceptable practice, and the latter, of an agent who follows
them. “Broker” denominates the identity of a social entrepreneur who creams the benefits of
bridging the non-redundant contacts in his network (Burt, 1992). Last, the paper brings
together two bodies of literature that have not conversed frequently (i.e., network governance
and identity) in a largely overlooked cultural and historical context, that of Spain after the
transition to democracy in 1975.
The paper is organized in the following way. The next section highlights the research
design, and the methods for data collection and analysis. Then, the extant theory on identity
and network governance evolution is reviewed selectively along key parameters and
dimensions, advanced in our framework. Propositions regarding the link identity-network
governance evolution are advanced, and then illustrated with three longitudinal comparative
case studies. Finally, we provide some conclusions emphasizing their limitations and
managerial implications, and draw attention to some avenues for future research.
Methods
Research Design
The paper aims at building a middle range theory, situated “in between
individualism and cultural holism” (White, 1992: xii). Middle range theories are
“intermediate to the minor working hypotheses evolved in abundance during the day-by-day
routines of research, and the all inclusive speculations comprising a master conceptual
scheme from which it is hoped to derive a very large number of empirically observed
uniformities of social behavior” (Merton, 1957).
The paper presents some insights drawn from a longitudinal, comparative case study.
Such a design facilitates the comprehension of the dynamics within single settings
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991). Treating the cases as whole entities, rather than as
collections of scores on variables allows contextual understanding of the relations between
the parts (Ragin, 1987). We follow design indications from Yin’s (1989) noteworthy text,
following a middle road between positivist and interpretive traditions. In a positivist way we
specify the core constructs a priori (Eisenhardt, 1989). Then, in a more grounded-theory-like
2fashion, we improve and enrich the framework by developing “deep cases” (Dyer & Wilkins,
1991). We do travel back and forth between theory and empirical evidence, with the
explanation appearing in abstract form, that is, constructed in theoretical language.
We focus on the cases of the three most renowned elite Spanish filmmakers, who
have received an Oscar award and have been acknowledged in the most important
international and local film festivals and events – two film directors (Pedro Almodóvar and
Fernando Trueba), and a film producer (Andrés Vicente Gómez). The cases are selected
through theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) – as opposed to statistical sampling –
to fit three distinctive theoretical categories of identity profiles (i.e., a maverick, an integrated
professional, and a broker) with important implications for the network governance
evolution. Furthermore, they are critical (deviant) cases for the Spanish cinema because of
their exceptional independence and their critical and commercial success, unlike the majority
of the local industry. 
Data Collection
The study combines multiple data collection methods, since triangulation through
methods’ multiplicity is expected to provide stronger substantiation of the constructs
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  First, extensive data on the film project networks’ content and results
(box office in Spain, most important local and international awards) were collected from the
Ministry of Education and Culture for each of the three filmmakers. Being the industry’s
regulator, the Ministry keeps extensive information on every film that is made. An open-
ended interview with Beatríz de Armas, Deputy-Director of Protection of the ICAA (the
Ministry’s Film Institute, which develops and implements the regulation policy) facilitated
the access not only to the film project archives, but also to industry analyses and institutional
policy documents. Interviewing a film critic-historian, and a film producer, who was expert
advisor in the initial stages of the project, captured further contextual peculiarities.
Extensive open-ended interviews were conducted at several points of time between
November 1999 and November 2000 with key collaborators involved in the network
governance of the three filmmakers (and whenever possible with the filmmakers themselves).
These interviews were preceded and followed by multiple telephone conversations for the
clarification of details, and were preceded combined with site visits at the filmmakers’
production companies. During the visits the researchers took observational notes. In the case
of Almodóvar, one of the authors spent several days in the premises of his company El
Deseo, working with the archives. Apart from the extensive amount of press clips and
company’s promotional materials that were reviewed, the researcher had the opportunity to
observe the daily routines of the team and to interact with it on an informal basis. 
Extensive secondary data included local and international press clips on the Spanish
film industry in general, and on the three filmmakers in particular. It also incorporated
transcripts of speeches or memos on film making issues by the three agents, as well as
published collections of interviews with reputable Spanish cinematographers, screenwriters,
and art directors, commenting, among other things, on their relations and work with Trueba,
Almodóvar and Gómez. To those were added accounts of the professional trajectories of the
three film makers in the Dictionary of Spanish Cinema, edited by the Spanish Film Academy,
in special TV programs featuring Almodóvar and Trueba, and extensively interviewing them
and their close collaborators and friends. Table 1 highlights the multiple methods used for the
collection of data on each of the cases.
3Table 1. Comparative Representation of Data Sources for the Three Cases
Data Analysis
Recently, even first rank economists acknowledge that “[i]f one settles for information
that is heterogeneous and largely qualitative, but nonetheless abundant, a great deal can be
learned on the economic organization and behavior” of creative industries (Caves, 2000: vii).
We approached the multiple data sources in a positivist-like fashion (Eisenhardt, 1989), using a
pre-conceived framework derived from the literature. Using within-case and between-cases
analyses, we then modified and developed the initial framework in a more grounded-theory like
fashion (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), travelling back and forth between theory and data.
To advance the theory out of the “staggering volume of data” (Eisenhardt, 1989) we
first transcribed the interviews, as well as video materials relevant to the research question of this
paper. Then we combined the transcribed data with other secondary sources and came out with
detailed case study write-ups for each of the three sites. Then we performed within-case analyses
on each filmmaker’s quest for identity and his networks governance evolution, illustrating each
of the constructs in our initial framework and exploring the links among (some of) them. 
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Site visits (to the offices “El Deseo” “Fernando Trueba P.C.” “Lolafilms”
of the independent – 7 visits – 1 visit – 1 visit
production companies of – archival work – observational notes – observational notes
the three film makers) – informal interaction
– observational notes
Interviews with key – 9 interviews (half- – 2 interviews (one of – 1 interview (notes
collaborators in the taped, half – notes them over the phone taken)
network governance taken) -taped) – various telephone
– various telephone – various telephone conversations for
conversations for conversations for clarification of details
clarification of details clarification of details
TV programs featuring – TV programs’ tapes – a TV program tape – transcripts of
the filmmakers; speeches on Almodóvar, his featuring Trueba Gómez’s speech on
and round tables speeches when the role of the
receiving awards at producer
local/international – 1998 Cannes Film
ceremonies (1999- Festival’s
2000) presentation of
– notes from a round Gómez among the
table and colloquium 12 best producers
with Amodóvar’s
participation
Ministry of Education Information on the participants in each of the feature films made by the three
and Culture (MEC) filmmakers in the last 25 years, the box office in Spain and the awards obtained
Electronic database
MEC Folders containing detailed information for each of the films made: e.g., co-production
Central Archive and other contracts, film budgets, memos of the film directors with description of
the film projects, and the artistic and technical decisions involved in them, etc.
Local and international Various sources from various years
press clips; books
Sources of information Pedro Almodóvar Fernando Trueba Andrés Vicente GómezNext we looked for cross-case patterns, delineating both similarities and differences
along the propositions advanced. To link the abundant qualitative data to our propositions, we
used “pattern-matching” of sequences or time-series of events – comparing and relating
pieces of information from the three cases to the theoretical arguments (Campbell, 1975).
Pattern-matching is a tactic addressing the issue of internal validity, which is about
“establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other
conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships” (Yin, 1989). Tying the emergent
theory to existing literature enhances the internal validity, generalizability, and theoretical
level of theory-building from case-study research (Eisenhardt, 1989).
The quest for identity: Nature, process, and parameters
In this paper we explore how agents govern their networks in the quest for identity.
Identity is the relatively stable and enduring constellation of attributes, beliefs, values,
motives, and experiences in terms of which people define themselves in a professional role
(Schein, quoted in Ibarra, 1999). Still, “identity is never a priori, nor a finished product; it is
only the ever problematic process of access to an image of totality” (Bhabha, quoted in
Howard (2000)). It provides energy to action (White, 1992: 4), while simultaneously
continuing to discover and reshape itself in action (Howard, 2000: 9). 
Different perspectives explore identity issues, emphasizing their individual or
collective nature. Howard (2000) reviews the social psychological underpinnings of
identities, focusing on social cognition and symbolic interactionism. Cerulo (1997) explores
perspectives on collective identities, such as social constructionism, postmodernism, and
identity politics. Strategy scholars also increasingly deal with identity issues because they
speak to the very definition of an entity, and convey its distinctiveness and oneness (Albert,
Ashforth, & Dutton, 2000: 13). 
Sociology has been abundant in attempts to trace the genesis of distinctive (group)
identities through the building of networks (e.g., Greenfeld, 1989; White & White, 1993).
Still, sociologists have focused mainly on the way artists embedded in a collective have
managed to introduce change in the institutional system. The peculiarity and added value of
this study lies precisely in bringing the account a layer down – from the group to the actor,
who designs and manages in a purposive way the networks.
In this study we adopt a micro approach to the nature of identity, focusing on two
identity parameters – social (depicted by the concept of role versatility), and personal
(captured by the notion of style). Role versatility refers to the variety of activities performed
by an artist simultaneously and/or successively to preserve agility and to increase control
over valuable resources. The creative person’s working time and earnings are divided among
the creative activity itself, art-related work (e.g., teaching activities and management tasks in
artistic organizations), and non-art work (Menger, 1999). 
Style is about the idiosyncratic attributes that distinguish an individual from others.
In cultural production it captures the made coherence and the claimed de-coupling from
social formations (White, 1992), as well as the different agent’s proficiency and/or different
traits of his or her work (Caves, 2000). A style of a film director could be idiosyncratic (e.g.,
a relatively limited range of recurrent genre(s), topics, characters, favorite locations, colors
and light) or universal (e.g., genre agility, varied characters and topics, different geographical
locations and language). A style of a producer is idiosyncratic when he or she specializes in
5particular genres and/or quality of films. An example in this sense is Ciby 2000, the French
film production company set up in 1991 by the construction magnate Francis Bouygues,
which until its exit from the business in the late 1990s signed production deals only with the
finest cinéastes (Dale, 1997). A producer has a universal style when he or she diversifies the
portfolio of projects by incorporating both A and B (with different quality) films (Caves,
2000), or films from a broad range of genres. Table 2 summarizes different perspectives and
contributions on the nature, process, and parameters of identity.
Table 2. Identity: Nature, Process, and Parameters
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Definition: The nature of identity
The relatively stable – Micro perspectives (social cognition, symbolic interactionism) with emphasis
and enduring on individual’s attributes, roles and social groups’ belonging (Howard, 2000)
constellation of
attributes, beliefs, – Macro perspectives (social constructionism, postmodernism, identity politics)
values, motives, and with focus on the collective (e.g., racial, national) identity (Cerulo, 1997)
experiences
(Schein, quoted in The process
Ibarra, 1999)
– Micro processes (Howard, 2000). Identity continuously discovers/shapes
itself in action  [e.g., self-presentation (Goffman, 1959), signaling (Jones, 
forthcoming)]
– Macro processes (Cerulo, 1997). Ruling cultural scripts and centers of power,
and coordinated actions of collectives to differentiate themselves, mold identity
– Identity bricolage (Carruthers & Uzzi, 2000). The reconfiguration of
economic roles and identities to engender new modes of exchange, allocation,
valuation
Role versatility: the Types of activities in an artist’s role versatility set (Menger, 1999)
different activities
(roles) performed by Combinatorial patterns of occupational roles in film making as adaptation or
an artist imitation strategy for accessing resources (Baker & Faulkner, 1991)
Style: the Differentiation in creative industries (Caves, 2000):
idiosyncratic – Horizontal – differences in traits, moods, styles of an artist, and/or his artwork
attributes that – Vertical – different plateaus of artists’ proficiency, different quality of artwork
distinguish an
individual from Style as integrating behavior across disparate network populations and discernible
others as package, which combines signals with social pattern (White, 1992)
Aesthetic style as determinant of the individual’s approach to the medium, genre, 
and problem solving techniques (Jones, forthcoming).
Identity Reference source
Identity Reference sourceThe quest for identity, we hypothesize, is linked to the process of network
governance. On the one hand, it is the network governor who makes or controls the most
important network governance choices, hence governing the network evolution. This paper
investigates the relative explanatory value of this micro-level factor (the quest for identity)
for the differences in network governance evolution. On the other hand, however, the link
between identity and network governance is not unidirectional. The interaction with a pool of
professionals (in the artistic labor market) and (more tightly) with the participants in the
project networks, activated from the professional pool, provides feedback and further moulds
the identity. The paper does not explore this feedback loop, though it acknowledges its
importance in the avenues for future research through the notions of drift and cross-influence.
Governing the network evolution: Critical dimensions
Despite the structural constraints, people play an active role in shaping their social
networks to achieve their goals (Ibarra, 1995). In the previous section we advanced one
possible micro-factor (the quest for identity by non-powerful agents) that may impact the
way networks are governed over time. Governance is about the authorities, roles, structures,
processes, and relationships that run an enterprise, and is consistently non-routine and dealing
with ambiguous problems and trade-offs (Walton, 1998). Network governance in particular
has been depicted as a dynamic, patterned process of organizing among semi-autonomous
entities (Jones et al., 1997). It is largely based on trust (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1996, 1997; Ring,
1997; Podolny & Page, 1998), on unilateral decision control and residual risk bearing
combined with periodical joint decision making by the transaction partners (Ebers, 1997),
and may involve institutionalized knowledge-sharing routines (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000).
Experience in network governance over time could be a source of strategic advantage (Anand
& Khanna, 2000).
Our managerial focus and the interest in tracing the micro links between networks
and identity justify the dimensions along which we scrutinize the network governance
evolution. We look at dimensions which agents in search of identity have the interest and the
power to affect.  Furthermore, depending on the identity profile pursued (i.e., maverick,
integrated, or entrepreneurial), the agents will choose different facets of each of these
dimensions. Network governance features along which the cases converge could be due, we
hypothesize, to the common context, business, and role structure in which they unfold.
This study proposes four inter-related dimensions along which micro aspects of
network governance evolution could be traced. These dimensions are (1) co-governance (a
more egalitarian definition of the network governor, celebrating both the visionary and his
talented and dedicated deputy); (2) structure (the permanent organizational arrangement,
which administers the project networks); (3) strategy (the approach to a project network’s
composition with respect to previously assembled networks), and (4) pace (the rhythm at
which new projects develop).  Table 3 offers a referenced definition of these dimensions and
their within-dimensional variety.
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Co-governance. It provides a more egalitarian understanding of the authority, who
controls the networks, focusing both on the charismatic leader and her exceptional deputy
(Heenan & Bennis, 1999). The co-governing could be embedded in symbiotic careers.
Symbiotic career is a career trajectory, sustained by a stable, affect- and trust-based couple
(e.g., an artist and his trustee), which shares highly differentiated tasks, which are usually
incompatible for carrying out by a single person (Alvarez & Svejenova, forthcoming). Trust
embedded in such strong, frequent personal relationships nested in wider networks is referred
to as thick (Putnam, 2000) or relational (Rousseau et al. 1998) trust. Under conditions of
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Co- A visionary/ Symbiotic careers (Alvarez & Svejenova, forthcoming): a trusted
governance A trusted and devoted altergo, committed to the career of a visionary
implementor 
Co-leadership (Heenan & Bennis, 1999): “celebrates those who
do the real work”, the truly exceptional deputies
Different attitudes and skills between artists and managers (Storr,
1985; Pedler et al., 1986; Sibillin, 2001)
Structure: Initial network of Impact of biotech startups’ alliance network composition at
a permanent support founding on their early performance (Baum et al., 2000)
organizational – Core/peripheral
arrangement, – Local/ A triggering entity (Doz et al., 2000): critical in R&D consortia,
which governs international in cases when interdependencies are difficult to recognize
the project
network(s) Subsequent structural Artists’ independent companies serve them to retain ownership
arrangements rights and rents over their artwork (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1999)
– Own/of others
– One/several Artists’ independent companies reduce structural constraints on
– Structural creativity and increase control over one’s artistic output (Alvarez
differentiation & Svejenova, forthcoming)
– Instrumental/
affective bonds in Talent agency as a broker that “packages” the creative inputs for
the team a film project (Bielby & Bielby, 1999)
Strategy: Composition of project A collectivist (highly exclusive and stable over time) versus an
refers to the networks individualist (highly inclusive and involving a large number of
project firms that work together only rarely) strategy (Jones et al., 1998)
network – Reception
composition – Alteration Network reproduction (social capital theory) is a better predictor
with respect to of cooperation over time than networks’ alteration (structural)
previously hole theory) by entrepreneurs (Walker et al., 2000)
assembled
networks “Brokers” who derive differentiation advantages from the ability
to reassemble a successful production team in a fluid
environment (Starkey et al., 2000)
Pace: the rate – One project at a Pace is an important, yet overlooked dimension in the study of
at which new time network evolution (Doz et al., 2000)
projects are – Several projects at
developed a time Time pacing is an active strategy of deciding on a calendar of
– No pace launching new products (Brown & Eusenhardt, 1998)
Dimension Within-dimension Reference source
(definition) typologyuncertainty and complexity, requiring mutual adjustment, characteristic for the film industry,
sustained effective coordinated action is only possible where there is mutual confidence and
trust (Thompson, quoted in McAllister, 1995).
Proposition 1a: Given the uncertainty and complexity characteristic of a
creative industry, and the need for effective coordinated action between art and
business, trust-based co-governance of independent companies and project
networks would be ubiquitous.
Psychological accounts of artistic and business activities in art show important
differences. For example, a creative person prefers complexity, asymmetry, and
incompleteness, rejects facile solutions, waiting to arrive alone at a more satisfying synthesis
(Storr, 1985). This may contradict the scheduled and budgeted logic of business. Further, an
artist need not be methodological and systematic, and often seeks to bend or break the rules
(Cummings & Oldham, 1997), which could contradict the repetitive and routine nature of
deal making and production. 
Analytical, problem-solving, and decision/judgement-making skills, balanced
learning habits and skills, command of basic facts, pro-activity (i.e. a tendency to respond
purposefully to events), are all qualities possessed by successful managers (Pedler, Burgoyne,
& Boydell, 1986). They are not necessarily compatible with the creative personality, which is
better portrayed by words such as independence, originality, impulsiveness, and
expansiveness (Storr, 1985). Bernard Arnault, the CEO of the LVMH luxury goods empire,
provides a nice summary of the artistic-business tension: “The creator is an artist and cannot
follow the same path as a businessman. When a creator invents, it is not a unified or rational
process. But the management side is very rational, organized and results-oriented. So the two
sides sometimes clash. It is from this type of contradiction that you create real progress, real
invention and, finally, real success” (Sibillin, 2001). Individual brands in LVMH preserve
their authenticity and autonomy by being co-run by an entrepreneur/manager and a
designer/creator.
Proposition 1b: Given the differences in artistic and business activities in required
skills, attitudes, and predisposition, co-governors would likely maintain role
differentiation (between artistic and business roles).
Structure. We could distinguish several structural patterns in a network context.
First, there usually is a permanent structure for network governance (e.g., independent
production company), which outlives the temporal project networks it assembles and
manages, and retains professional knowledge and relational expertise. Second, professionals
in a creative industry operate in a net of professional contacts, out of which the project
networks are selectively activated (e.g., Hulbert, Haines, & Beggs, 2000). Last, it is the
project network, as a coalescence of professionals and resources over a short period of time
until the completion of the project (e.g., Faulkner & Anderson, 1987; Baker & Faulkner,
1991; DeFillippi & Arthur, 1998). In this study, under the dimension called “structure”, we
scrutinize exclusively the peculiarities of the permanent organizational arrangement that
designs, assembles, and manages temporary networks. 
We also distinguish between initial and subsequent permanent support structures.
The network through which an agent enters the industry is an important source of knowledge,
visibility, legitimacy, or freedom (see Baum et al. (2000) on the impact of the startups’
alliance network composition at founding on their early performance). Once the actors have
made their claim for professional inclusion in the industry, they may substitute their
9independent permanent structures for those that have initially facilitated them. Having an
independent production company in a creative industry is a way to reduce structural
constraints on creativity and to increase control over one’s artistic output, retaining
ownership rights and rents over artwork (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1999; Alvarez & Svejenova,
forthcoming). Permanent structures, however, may differ in their degree of specialization and
integration of activities from the industry’s value chain.
Proposition 2a: Non-powerful agents in the quest for identity would tend to
establish independent companies to govern the networks for the making of their
projects according to their liking.
Artists who pursue identities deviant from the legitimate patterns in the field may
face unwillingness or inability of the industry’s infrastructure to service the collaborative
needs of their artwork (Becker, 1982). Attempts to break the canons of acceptable practice
are found costly in economic, cognitive, and social terms, with reduced legitimacy and hence,
penalties, such as reduced access to resources derived from legitimacy (Baker & Faulkner,
1991; Zuckerman, 1999; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000, Human & Provan, 2000). Still,
actors ensconced in certain identities and in need of control (White, 1992) may try to break
these structural constraints and build their own teams of collaboration. Teams based on close,
affective, and binding relationships – expressive bonds, which at the same time are
instrumental (Ibarra, 1993) – would serve as “systems for making decisions, mobilizing
resources, concealing or transmitting information, and performing other functions closely
allied with work behavior and interaction”.
Proposition 2b: The farther an agent’s identity is from the legitimate identities in a
field, the more likely he is to assemble a team with affective ties in his independent
company.
Strategy. It refers to the project network’s composition with respect to previously
assembled networks. A new project network could reassemble clusters of cohesive ties
(Starkey et al., 2000), or alter the network’s content by bridging previously disconnected
subgroups (Walker et al., 1997; Frank & Yasumoto, 1998). The ability to reconvene a
successful production team in a fluid environment where the majority of workers are
essentially “nomadic” is a source of differential advantage and could secure continuity and
understanding of the complex creative style of the core agent around whose vision the
network is assembled.
Proposition 3a: An agent with idiosyncratic style would predominantly reconvene
cohesive clusters of professionals in successive project networks to enhance
understanding and to secure continuity of his stylistic peculiarity.
Proposition 3b: An agent with universal style would predominantly alter project
networks’ content depending on the type of project at hand.
Pace. The pace at which project networks are assembled is a relevant, yet
overlooked dimension in the study of network evolution (e.g., Doz et al., 2000). Brown and
Eisenhardt (1998) conceptualize time pacing as an active strategy of deciding on a calendar
of launching of new products (or film projects in our case). They juxtapose it to the reactive
strategy of event pacing, where the company waits for the environment to decide for it the
appropriateness of one action over another. The issue of pace is especially relevant for a
creative industry with uncertainty of matching between the artistic and business subsystems.
The ability to maintain a steady pace of project development (independence) could be a way
for distinction building.
10Proposition 4a: A steady pace of project networks’ development would be
ubiquitous among agents in quest of identity.
Additional distinction could result from the rate of pacing. The assembly and
management of one versus several projects at a time would require different network
governance mechanisms. In the case of one project at a time, a permanent structure based on
thick trust could secure tight control over the artwork for its entrepreneur. If several projects
are developed simultaneously, however, a highly specialized formal structure will be more
effective. Further, the quest for identity (e.g., a style giving primacy to original script over one
based on an existing literary work; a strategy of reconvening certain professionals) may further
accelerate or slow down the pace. Many unexpected events could also affect the pace at which
a project develops (see the documentary “Hearts of Darkness – A Filmmaker’s Apocalypse”
on the painful and long journey of UCLA, Hollywood “boy wonder” – Francis Ford Coppola –
in the making of the disaster-laden Vietnam epic production, “Apocalypse Now”).
Proposition 4b: An agent’s choices regarding the structure (the degree of
differentiation of the triggering entity) and the strategy (repetition versus alteration
of consecutive networks) would influence the pace at which she is able to assemble
the project networks.
Overview of the Context
Network governance is historically and culturally embedded (Emirbayer & Goodwin,
1994). Hence, the cases we scrutinize can be understood only in relation to their context – the
Spanish film industry after the transition to democracy. This section briefly describes this
context. In 1977, two years after General Franco’s death, film censorship was officially banned
by Royal Decree, giving Spanish filmmakers freedom of expression. In January 1984 another
Royal Decree introduced the policy of advance subsidies, which provided financing for
producers of quality experimental films during the development stage. Aimed at aiding an
impoverished¸ though not non-existent industry, the decree further weakened the production
sector since many directors registered their own production companies in order to claim
subsidies. The mortality rate among these companies was extremely high – only a few outlived
the projects for which they were initially set up.
The new wave of directors whose careers were launched in the post-Franco era tended
towards idiosyncrasy rather than to the collective labels (and collective identities) characteristic
of the past. Yet only a few of them gained the freedom to make the projects of their choice and
managed to shape a distinctive identity. Among the film directors of the 1980s, two are
particularly associated with the definitive break with the past and with artistic singularity –
Pedro Almodóvar and Fernando Trueba (both of whom are featured in this study). Trueba has
approached the field as an “integrated professional” (Becker, 1982), backed up by the field’s
infrastructure and respecting its professional norms. In contrast, Almodóvar has been
recognized as a “maverick” (Becker, 1982), working at odds with the canons of accepted
practice and largely neglected by the field’s establishment.
In a weak industry, another way to become a powerful and distinctive player is by
working on a larger scale than the rest of the industry (bridging resources, contacts, and
expertise for the making of several projects at a time). Representative of this way of gaining
independence and centrality in the field’s elite is the third case in our study, that of the film
producer Andrés Vicente Gómez, who acts as a broker, bringing together local, European, and
Hollywood professional and financial networks.
11The three cases featured in the paper rose to prominence in the field in the late 1980s.
In the 1990s, the trend to singularity flourished, with the irruption of several very gifted novice
film directors, who broke with the traditional genres and with the “auteur” complex, and started
making films with clear audience appeal. This has challenged Almodóvar and Trueba’s
centrality in the elite, yet both of them are willing to give a helping hand to these novice
directors, offering them the comfort and expertise of their production structures (this is also true
for Gómez) in their initiation in the field. 
Hence, a major exogenous shock in the context of an institutional field provides a
window of opportunity for gifted and ambitious non-powerful agents in the quest for identity to
rise up to centrality in the field’s elite and to become free to make the projects of their choice.
We are interested in actors with entrepreneurial personality who resist external attempts to
control their behavior (Amabile, 1996) and seek ownership rights to the fruits of their artistic
behavior (DeFillippi & Arthur, 1999). In such situations of uncertainty, these agents confront
“weak situations” (Weick, 1996), which give few guidelines for action; yet, on the other hand,
structures are softer and can be molded more easily by the actors (Alvarez, 2000).
The cases
The propositions advanced in the theoretical section of the paper are contrasted with
the cases of three reputable Spanish film makers (Almodóvar, Trueba, and Gómez), all of
whom rose to centrality and power in the industry’s elite in the mid-1980s. They entered the
field long before their professional consolidation, governing the evolution of their project
networks in the quest for identity. 
Almodóvar pursues a maverick identity (Becker, 1982) and develops an
idiosyncratic style in terms of cinematographic language and toolkit. He is self-trained, and
his familiarity with the art and craft of filmmaking comes from learning by doing and
experimentation, unhindered by film academicism. The novel style and aesthetic standards,
initially severely criticized or ignored by the establishment, are now highly acclaimed signs
of his distinctive artistic personality. The quest for professionalism as a style (White, 1992)
has driven Almodóvar to reshape his role versatility set. Initially dispersed (making short
films, playing in a spoof pop-rock group, writing for underground magazines, acting in an
amateur theatrical troupe, and working as a clerk in the Spanish telecom company), his role
versatility set has focused mostly on script writing (predominantly, original scripts without a
co-author) and directing.
Trueba’s identity as an integrated professional who respects the cinema’s canons and
has the technical abilities, social skills, and conceptual apparatus to make it easier to make art
(Becker, 1982) is apparent in the universality of his style, which encompasses different
genres (comedy, historical drama, thriller, documentary), topics, locations and language. He
usually co-authors the scripts of his movies and bases them mostly on existing literary
materials. In addition, his role versatility set has become broader over time, opening up to
diverse activities (running a publishing company for film scripts, making TV series, editing a
film magazine, writing a film dictionary, etc.). Apart from being a director and scriptwriter,
he is also a producer, alternating between directing his own movies and producing those of
other film directors.
12Gómez entered filmmaking through international, core, professional players, which
has given him exposure to professional networks with a large scale and scope of operations, and
different rules of the game than apply in Spain. He started up an independent film production
company in Spain in the early 1970s, trying to develop a universal style. His consolidation as a
producer came in the mid-1980s, when he came into contact with several elite Spanish film
directors and began to develop long-term professional, and later personal, relationships with
them. In the 1990s his quest to become the number one producer in Spain led him to produce at
a rate of 10 films per year (an extraordinary pace for what, in Spain, was such a weak industry)
and to produce films both in Spanish and in English. His role versatility set indicates his desire
to become a broker and acquire a universal style. His core role as a film producer is
complemented by his role as director of the Media Business School (initially an EU initiative
backed by the MEDIA Program, focused on training producers) and as a founding member of
an elite Paris-based European producers’ think tank. This role versatility allows him to bridge
sectors of the geographically dispersed Spanish, European, and American networks.
Table 4 depicts the three cases in a summary form, comparing them along the
identity parameters and the network governance dimensions advanced in the theoretical
section of the paper.
Table 4. Governing Network Evolution in the Quest for Identity:
Comparative Summary for Three Elite Spanish Filmmakers (1975-2000)
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Identity Maverick Integrated professional Broker
profiles (Pedro Almodóvar) (Fernando Trueba) (Andrés Vicente Gómez)
Identity parameters
Role From broad to narrow Increasingly broad Increasingly broad
versatility:
focus
Role Film director Film director Producer
versatility: Scriptwriter Scriptwriter
core role (s) Producer
Style Idiosyncratic Universal Universal
Dimensions of network governance evolution
Co-governor/ his brother Agustín/ his wife Cristina/ a deputy/
Role art and business art and business strategic and day-to-day issues
differentiation
Permanent First producer (external): First producer (external): First producer (external):
structure for local, amateur, non-central local, professional, central international, professional,
networks central
governance Subsequent producers Independent company (own):
(chronology (external): local, professional – small team (3-4 people) Independent company (own):
sequence) – thick trust and affection – from one to several 
Independent company (own): – low differentiation of tasks  companies to channel
– growing team (from 2 to 10) – control over local financing different projects and
– thick trust, affection and production diversity risks
– relatively differentiated tasks The biggest of his companies:
– control over the entire value Co-production: permanent – big team (approx. 50 people)
chain of filmmaking broker for foreign financing – high differentiation of tasks
and distribution (Gómez) – integrates from development
Co-production: to distribution
from more active to financial – participation of industrial
co-producers conglomerate (70%)
Strategy Reconvenes (alters seldom) Mix: reconvenes and alters Mix: reconvenes and alters
Pace Steady Steady Initially unsteady until
– one film / year (1980s) – one film / year, consolidation as film producer
– one film / 2 years (1990s) – balance between own films – increasing pace up to ten
– predominantly own films and production for others projects per year (in 2000)Discussion
The Maverick
The maverick breaks the conventions which constrain his creativity (Becker, 1982),
and hence faces difficulties in gaining recognition from the field’s establishment and
enjoying the resources to which legitimacy gives access (Becker, 1982; Baker & Faulkner,
1991; see also Zuckerman (1999) on the social penalties of defying classification). Mavericks
may also meet with resistance from audiences, which makes it hard for them to make  a
living from their art (White & White, 1993). Yet, if properly backed by governance structures
and strategies, deviance can lead such actors to a central position in the field (e.g., Padgett &
Ansell, 1993). 
Pedro Almodóvar is a “maverick director” (Dale, 1997), “the last European auteur in
a world dominated by Hollywood” (Smith, 1999). His novel, provocative and, initially,
technically impure style arouses controversy among professionals and film critics, yet it
attracted audiences from the very beginning. Pedro’s international recognition (for his Oscar-
nominated, box-office hit “Women on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown” (1987)) came less
than a decade after his initiation in the film industry and long before his full-fledged
acceptance by the Spanish Film Academy (seven Goya awards for his Oscar-winning movie
“All About My Mother” (2000)), two decades after his first movie was shown. 
The project network put together for Pedro’s first film replicated his social circle
(friends were erratically involved in the financing, production, and acting). The result was an
extremely novel, risky, and singular movie, noticed (not without polemics) by professionals
and audience. The visibility this gave Almodóvar enabled him to win over local production
companies to trigger the project networks for his next four films (making one film per year),
which appealed to audiences and did relatively well for the local industry. 
Unhindered by the canons of an academic training in film making,  Almodóvar
became a distinctive artist, driven by his creativity, experimenting, and “learning by doing”
the intricacies of the profession. He gained full control over his deviant art work only after
setting up his own production company, El Deseo, with his brother Agustín, and reproducing
his film project networks (in sync with Becker’s (1982) claim that mavericks have to build
their own art worlds). The partnering with his brother (who became the director of the
company and executive producer of Pedro’s movies) was motivated by the belief that only
somebody very close and trusted could understand and service, in a committed and
unrestricted way, Pedro’s ideas from their germ. 
El Deseo’s first two films were co-produced with an established Spanish production
and distribution company, using its financial and distribution resources, and learning in the
process. The second of the co-produced features (“Women on the Verge of a Nervous
Breakdown”) –the zenith of the rising-up-to-elite phase of Almodóvar’s trajectory– brought
him international visibility and recognition, and marked a change in his project governance
approach. He became more professionally mature, working at a pace of one project every two
years in order to carefully prepare all aspects of his movies. At the end of the 1980s, the
brothers could afford to expand and differentiate their production structure beyond what was
usual for most Spanish production companies, which tended to have only a producer and a
secretary. The in-house team (which had been working in the company for more than ten
years by now) became the permanent structural mechanism which governed the project
networks for Pedro’s films through a replication strategy (repetition of key cast and crew).
Pedro perceived the team as his “second family” (Francia, 2000), a cohesive nucleus which
allowed the continuity of his singularity and gave him full control over his artwork. 
14Several changes marked Pedro’s network governance evolution in the 1990s. First,
two of his core and frequent actors left him, demonstrating that an art world’s reproduction
strategy is not sustainable in the long run in an unchanged fashion (Becker, 1982). Second, El
Deseo co-produced a series of films with the French production company Ciby 2000,
obtaining attractive financing to work with complete freedom on Pedro’s projects. Third, El
Deseo used its network of contacts and its financial and production resources and expertise to
produce (selectively and infrequently) novice film directors when the company’s
infrastructure was not busy with one of Pedro’s films. 
Trust and affection breed commitment to the maverick and his peculiar style, and
give him the freedom to pursue his creative whims unrestricted (see Lawler & Yoon (1996,
1998) and Lawler & Thye (1999) on the parameters of relational cohesion). Outside the
boundaries of his collaborative network, however, his discretion and his distinctive stamp are
difficult to sustain. Almodóvar’s artwork is deeply rooted in his Spanish collaborative
network and in Spanish culture, hence his reluctance to respond favorably to Hollywood’s
courtship (where bonds of friendship are replaced by professional networks, unionized rules,
and organization charts). His singularity and freedom are sustainable only when embedded in
his local collaborative network.
The Integrated Professional
The integrated professional has the “technical abilities, social skills, and conceptual
apparatus necessary to make it easy to make art” that is recognizable and understandable to
others without being trivial (Becker, 1982). Fernando Trueba has been an integrated
professional since the pre-professional phase of his film trajectory, when he embraced the
conventions of the field, both in his university training in filmmaking (which he never
completed) and in his work as a professional film critic. Unlike Almodóvar, his first film’s
project network was engineered professionally by an established film director and yielded a
novel yet not risky movie, with a wide appeal to both audience and critics. Trueba could not
rely unconditionally on the industry’s infrastructure, which, after the huge commercial
success of his first feature, refused to make his rather personal second movie. In response, he
formed his own production company. His wife became his executive producer. A few years
later he began to work on repeated occasions with the producer and distributor Gómez. The
friendship that developed out of this collaboration allowed Trueba to make movies that were
both commercial and highly personal, without restrictions, since Gómez trusted his artistic
talent, as well as his own and his team’s production expertise. 
Trueba’s universal style and his affinity to both film direction and production led to
a broad role versatility set, and a steady pace of one film project network per year. He has
directed his own films and produced those of other directors, made feature films and TV
programs, is editor of a film magazine, and publishes film scripts and books with interviews. 
The 1993 Oscar for best foreign film for “Belle Époque” (directed by Trueba and
produced by Gómez) consolidated him internationally as a distinctive elite film director, and
enabled him to pursue his dream of filming in the US a Hollywood-style comedy with
Hollywood name talent. Gómez provided a budget that was big for Spain, yet modest for
filming in the US. This, together with the peculiarities of the highly professionalized and
highly unionized Hollywood system, confronted Trueba’s production team (led by his wife as
executive producer and her sister as line producer), which governs each film project network,
with enormous difficulties. Trueba’s recent filmography is in line with his quest for
universality, and expands his style to the documentary genre, with a film on a favorite topic
of his –Latin jazz. 
15An integrated professional’s freedom is broader than that of a maverick in the sense
that universality of style and obedience to conventions make it easier for an agent to find
support for his projects. Universality may increase freedom, yet it may diminish
distinctiveness. 
The Broker
Brokerage is normally done by the big studios, who secure financing and
distribution, picking up creative content (Dale, 1997), or obtaining it through talent agencies,
which package talent and other film professionals for specific projects (Bielby & Bielby,
1999). Brokerage activities allow markets to clear in a business context surrounded by
ambiguity, risk, and uncertainty (Bielby & Bielby, 1999: 66), with the power of brokers
residing in their positional capacity to connect otherwise disconnected (or at least relationally
constrained) groups (Burt, 1992). For a rich ethnographic explanation of brokering in a small
region (at IDEO, the largest product design consulting firm in the United States), followed by
a general discussion about brokering in other settings, see Hargadon & Sutton (1997).
A film producer becomes prominent in the industry’s elite if he is able to link
otherwise non-redundant contacts between film investors, artistic and technical professionals,
production infrastructure, and distribution networks, exploiting both information and control
advantages (Burt, 1992). In an atomized film industry, such as in Spain, with very few viable
production structures, a producer capable of making several films per year, securing film
budgets far above the industry average, and making both local and international projects, is
definitely elite and distinctive.
This is the case of Gómez, one of the most important Spanish film producers, who
set out to make his production company, Lolafilms, 70% owned by Telefónica, the Spanish
telecoms company, the biggest film-making machine in Spain and Latin America, capable of
producing 50 films in 5 years, 40% of which were filmed directly in English. 
Gómez’s film trajectory began in the trenches of international film production. This
immersed him in a world (and its underlying professional networks, rules, and relational
expertise) that was unknown to the obscure, weak and, at that time, censored Spanish film
industry of the 1960s. The professional knowledge and expertise he accumulated, and the
invaluable contacts he made, allowed him to found his first production company. The
company made one or two films a year, without any great artistic or commercial success. At
the same time he worked for two years in another boundary-spanning position (as the
manager for international co-productions for one of the biggest Spanish producers of the
time) This further boosted his international contacts and expertise. 
It was not until the mid-1980s that the quest for identity and distinction in film
production crystallized in Gómez, as he began to produce a steady stream of gifted
film directors, both established figures and novices, through two of his companies,
integrating production and distribution. To diversify risks he produced both A and B movies
(Caves, 2000). In relational terms, he maintained a bifurcated strategy, in which he gave full
artistic and production discretion to film directors whom he trusted, while controlling and
guiding the rest, usually novice directors, in film development and production.
While speed of project network assembly is important for a person’s consolidation
as a powerful producer, role versatility is another key dimension, since it allows the producer
to expand his network efficiently and effectively (Burt, 1992). Gómez has increased the range
16and non-redundancy of his network through various art-related activities (e.g., he is a
founding member of the elite Paris-based film producers’ think-tank; and he is founder and
director of the EU film training center in Spain). At the same time, he has not lost his focus
on his core role in executive film production and distribution. 
Between 1994 and 1996, as head of production for what was at the time the only
Spanish major-like company, he further enhanced his brokerage abilities and succeeded in
channeling film projects through his independent company at a steady pace. Later, he
orchestrated the entry of the national telecom (Spain’s largest multinational) into his
company, Lolafilms, with 70% of the capital. In addition, he maintained his other companies
as instruments for risk diversification and for channeling projects which do not fit the
interests and objectives imposed by this major investor. 
In 1993 he received the Oscar for best foreign film for “Belle Époque”, yet the peak
of his professional acknowledgement was the 1998 Cannes film festival tribute to him and 11
other reputable film producers for supporting the creativity of film directors. 
The freedom of the broker resides, on the one hand, in the possibility he has to make
film projects that are very different in style and quality, at a steady pace, producing several
films simultaneously. On the other hand, he is free to undertake ambitious projects (usually
associated with the bridging of local and international financial, artistic, and production
networks) since he has the contacts and is capable of securing the necessary financing.
Finally, by employing a bifurcated strategy, in which he relieves his production structure of
direct involvement in the making of the films of directors he trusts personally and
professionally, he is able to concentrate its energies on supervising and assisting novice
directors and developing new projects.
Concluding remarks
This paper provides insights on the evolution of network governance by using a
level of analysis lower than the predominant organizational and inter-organizational levels. It
explores the impact of the quest for identity by initially non-powerful agents on network
governance dimensions, to which macro-level analyses have been less sensitive. After a
major exogenous shock in the field’s context, as was Spain’s transition to democracy
following the death of the dictator Franco in 1975, there was a window of opportunity for
agents willing and able to shape collaborative structures according to their interests.
The quest for maverick, integrated, or broker identity leads in all three cases to the
equifinal outcomes of the agent’s inclusion in the industry’s elite, and his recognition by
critics (all three filmmakers are Oscar winners) and audience (i.e., high box office in the local
industry). In terms of similarities, all three set up their independent production entities in
order to be able to govern their projects unhindered (confirming Proposition 2a). These
entities, however, have different degrees of structural differentiation. Gómez, who pursues
the identity of “number one” producer in Spain, has the backing of a highly specialized
structure of approximately 50 people, which integrates activities from film development to
distribution; he also has an office in London. Furthermore, he works through several
companies, rather than just through one, using structures as instruments for diversification of
his project portfolio. 
17Trueba’s company is small and almost non-differentiated, since as an integrated
professional he could easily find support from existing art worlds. Being a maverick,
Almodóvar cannot count on such support and has had to develop a differentiated production
structure of ten people, bound by both expressive and instrumental ties, in the service of his
idiosyncrasy (Proposition 2b illustrated).
The independent production companies of the three agents are run by co-governors
(Proposition 1a illustrated), where the agent and his deputy are bound by trust (in all three
cases) and affection (in the cases of the two film directors). Further, the different skills,
attitudes, and predispositions require co-leaders to maintain differentiation of roles along the
art-business divide (Proposition 1b is confirmed clearly in the case of Almodóvar, who
concentrates exclusively on artistic activities, while his brother deals with the business
issues). In the case of Trueba, the result is inconclusive because of his tendency to combine
the roles of director and scriptwriter with that of producer. In the case of Gómez, the role
differentiation between the co-governors is based on strategic activities (performed by
Gómez) versus day-to-day management of operations (done by his deputy).
The distinctive identity pursued by the three filmmakers leads to differences in the
strategy for the networks’ composition. Almodóvar, whose style is extremely idiosyncratic,
tends to reconvene cohesive clusters of professionals, thus allowing his collaborators to better
understand his style and secure continuity of his artwork (confirming Proposition 3a).
Compared with Almodóvar, both Trueba and Gómez, influenced by their universality, tend to
alter their project networks’ composition, Gómez much more so than Trueba, due to his core
role of producer (confirming Proposition 3b). Still, the repetition-alteration divide is not all
that clear. Both Trueba and Gómez tend to reconvene certain parts of their network (mostly
the people they trust and/or like), while Almodóvar sometimes replaces frequent
collaborators in his projects due to a severing of relations, their unavailability due to their
work in other projects, or simply, the peculiarities of the story at hand. More careful research
is needed to disentangle not only the degree of repetition or alteration, but also the
conditions, which may influence the choice of one strategy over the other. 
As to the pace of network governance evolution, the three cases demonstrate that
agents who pursue distinctiveness in the field have to feed the system with artwork on a
regular basis (confirming Proposition 4a). What is difficult to know, however, is what
determines whether the pace will be fast (several projects at a time) or slow (one project at a
time). The answer to this question is context-specific. It will depend on the industry in which
the trajectories of the filmmakers unfold (in the underdeveloped Spanish film industry, both
one film per year and ten films per year signal a viable, fast-paced production structure).
Making one film per year (or every two years), when it is the film director himself who
organizes the production, while maintaining stylistic idiosyncrasy, is fast (especially if the
script is original, since a script takes between 6 and 8 months to develop, according to
industry experts). Whether a structure is  able to handle more than one project per year will
also depend on how developed and specialized it is. Only once in Almodóvar’s whole
trajectory has his team handled three projects in one year (1995), and they all agreed that this
was stretching their physical and organizational resources and capabilities to the very limit.
Since then, they have gone back to the rate of one Almodóvar film every two years, with
sporadic productions for other directors while Pedro develops his next project. Further, a
preference for reconvening certain professionals may delay project completion if those
professionals are working on other projects, due to the “nomadic” nature of filmmaking.
Hence, while our cases’ insights make Proposition 4b sound appealing to common sense,
further research is needed to distinguish the factors that influence the pace of network
governance from possible spurious effects.
18The issues dealt with in this paper have implications beyond the immediate context
of the Spanish filmmaking industry. They relate to the broader concerns of entrepreneurs who
wish to develop a distinctive identity in their respective industry, or to make the products or
projects of their choice unhindered. Working through temporary organizations may give them
the necessary agility and flexibility to adapt their business to changes in the environment.
Still, they should be aware that the pursuit of a particular identity (in sync or at odds with the
legitimate patterns in the industry) will impact their network governance choices over time. 
In order to govern networks according to his personal preferences and ideas, a
visionary entrepreneur may want to have a trusted and committed co-governor –a
“copreneur” (Marshack, 1998) or a “co-leader” (Heenan & Bennis, 1999)– to relieve him
from extremely important tasks that are essential for the business but for which he lacks the
time or the skills. In addition to having a co-governor with role differentiation, the
entrepreneur may be able to boost the performance of his project-based undertakings if he has
an independent company to assemble and manage the projects. The availability of a
permanent structure will allow him to retain knowledge generated through temporary
organizations and freelance contributors, and develop relational expertise, which is
considered a competitive advantage in a networked environment. 
Further, if the identity which the entrepreneur is trying to develop and project is
idiosyncratic and at odds with the establishment, he may want to differentiate the
independent structure so that it is able to control all the key aspects of the project network
governance, and assemble a committed rather than a purely professional team. He may prefer
to reconvene professionals who already know his style and preferences, thus economizing on
coordination and gaining continuity in the direction of the desired identity. Entrepreneurs
who look for inclusion in the industry’s elite may want to endorse their claim by pro-active
instead of reactive behavior, developing products or projects at a steady pace instead of
waiting for the environment to provide opportunities for innovation. The sustainability of a
steady pace and its rate (slow or fast) would require fine-tuning of the structural
differentiation choice.
The findings reported in this paper have to be taken with caution due to the nature of
the study – a longitudinal, comparative case study of three reputable filmmakers. First, we
focus on three successful cases. It will be insightful, we believe, for better understanding the
link between identity and network governance evolution, to scrutinize cases of filmmakers
who have failed to differentiate themselves (in terms of critical acclaim and audience appeal).
Does their network governance evolve in similar or in different ways?
Second, the three cases are renowned public figures whose actions and image are
constructed by and through the media. Therefore, the reasons an actor gives discursively for
acting in the way he does may diverge from the rationale he employs at the moment of acting
(Giddens (1984): 4; see also Goffman (1959) on self-presentation, and Jones (forthcoming)
on signaling). This issue is further complicated by the longitudinal nature of the study,
capturing a period of 25 years, in which experiences may be forgotten, or rationalized ex-post
(Weick, 1969).
Third, though it has admitted the duality of structure as both constraining and
enabling for the actors who pursue distinctive identity and recognition (Becker, 1982; White,
1992), this study has focused on the primacy of agents in shaping the structures according to
their interests and needs. Below we outline two important ways in which a temporary
collaborative network may impact upon the identity of the network governor (i.e., cross-
influence and drift), and propose them as two core issues in an agenda which seeks a deeper
understanding of the network governance-identity link.
19Avenues for future research
Cross-influence. It is acknowledged that “art worlds typically have intimate and
extensive relations with the worlds from which they try to distinguish themselves. They share
sources of supply with those other worlds, recruit personnel from them, adopt ideas that
originate in them, and compete with them for audiences and financial support. In some sense,
art worlds and worlds of commercial, craft, and folk art are parts of a larger social
organization. So, even though everyone involved understands and respects the distinctions
which keep them separate, a sociological analysis should take account of how they are not so
separate after all” (Becker, 1982: 36).
In order to offer a more complete account of the link between network governance
evolution and the quest for identity, future studies should pay attention to the degree and the
impact of cross-influence on the development of distinctive style. Network analyses could
quantify the degree of sharing of professionals (e.g., cinematographers, artistic directors,
leading actors) by filmmakers, while at the same time looking for interview-based data on the
concrete experiences through which such cross-influence manifests itself. 
The evidence on the sharing of such resources would allow investigation of the
relatedness of the exchanges in the field, and the transfer of practices and knowledge from
one project network to another. Such cross-fertilization among projects is possible due to the
nature of the business. On the one hand, output is produced by temporary arrangements,
which constitute a coalescence of careers. On the other hand, the career of a creative
professional is a string of project networks, triggered by network governors (e.g., film
directors) with differing styles and practices.
A complementary issue to cross-influence is that of lock-in and lock-out effects
(Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000). The idea here is that ties formed with one actor will place
constraints on ties with others. It could be insightful to trace whether professionals who tend
to work recurrently with certain directors/producers are excluded because of this from
working with other filmmakers. Analyzing network data in terms of who works with whom
would not provide sufficient detail. The reasons why somebody is excluded from a project
could be established through interviews (or even through survey data). Further, it is
interesting to assess the role of the context on the inclusion/exclusion behavior. If the pool of
professionals available for project collaboration is huge and constantly renewed, as is the
case in Hollywood, excluding certain professionals would still leave a filmmaker with
sufficient variety and choice. Filmmakers in smaller, more local industries, however, may
face difficulties at the time of practicing boundary work, due to talent scarcity.
Drift. Identity could be affected not only by cross-influence and lock-in/lock-out
behavior, but also by features emerging from the interaction of network collaborators, or
what Becker (1982) calls drift. Drift is “a slight shift –even an accident– in, say, a dancer’s
performance, or in the way paint adheres to a canvas. With repetition and exploration, drift
becomes a stronger tendency; it is recognized by an art world only when it becomes a change
strong enough to cause major reorganization of the canons, conventions, and social patterns
of that world” (White & White, 1993: 164). While drift may lead to stylistic alterations, it
does not require a change in the project network governance. There is no need for “any
troublesome reorganization of their cooperative activities...The people who cooperate to
produce work will continue to do so, even though the work they produce is different”
(Becker, 1982).
20While drift is even more difficult to control for than cross-influence, we do expect it
to have an impact on the quest for identity and the evolution of network governance. Since it
may give birth to initially unsought, yet beneficial, innovations as an outcome of the
collaboration, network governors may want to create a context that is conducive to drift.
They may want to retain and further develop the drift into a permanent feature of their style
or creative output. For this purpose, the governance of the project network should allow both
sufficient freedom for drift to take place and sufficient control to channel the drift in a
desirable direction. It should also be capable of detecting valuable drifts and the conditions
under which they have taken place. The permanent structure for network governance may
need to develop mechanisms for capturing and retaining drift-like innovations for their use in
other project networks. Furthermore, a strategy of reconvening professionals at a steady pace
may be necessary in order to convert a desired drift into a routine practice.
This paper is only a step in the direction of providing more micro accounts on
network governance evolution, which will inform managers’ concerns. There is a huge
terrain available for scholarly investigation to overcome the paucity of detail on identity and
network governance evolution.
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